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A  crucial  aspect  of  the  psychology  of  economic  agents  is  learning.  In  economic  theory  learning 
behavior  of  human  beings  occurs,  in  general,  in  a  rather  primitive  fashion.  Insofar  as  agents’ 
learning  behavior  is  introduced  in  formal  economic  models,  it  shows  up  in  the  form  of  the 
adaptation  of  the  values  of  parameters  or  variables.  The  structure  of  the  model  employed  is 
considered  to  be  given.  In  this  article  a taxonomy  of  learning  is presented,  in which  the  adaptation 
of  parameter  and  variable  values  is just  one  of  the  manifestations  of  actual  learning  behavior  of 
human  beings  in  an  economic  world.  The  argument  is  illustrated  with  the  help  of  economic 
theories  of  expectations  formation. 
1. Introduction:  Economic  learning 
A  well-known  piece  of  conventional  wisdom  is  reflected  in  the 
proverb  that  one is never  too  old to learn.  This  saying  also  holds  for  the 
economic  agent.  Learning  is  an  important  manifestation  of  the  psy- 
chology  of  the  economic  agent.  The  investigation  of  learning  behavior 
of  economic  agents  offers  rich  opportunities  to  economic  psychology. 
In  this  respect,  interesting  research  has  been  done  aimed  at  mapping 
children’s  learning  processes  concerning  economic  concepts  and  behav- 
ior  (see,  for  instance,  Maital  1982:  24-53;  Furnham  and  Lewis  1986: 
25-70;  and  Lea  et  al.  1987:  371-399). 
However,  not  only  children  need  to  become  familiar  with  economic 
concepts  and  behavior,  but  also  adults  must  adapt  time  and  again  to 
*  Author’s  address:  A.  van  Witteloostuijn,  University  of  Limburg,  Faculty  of  Economics  and 
Business  Administration,  P.O.  Box  616,  6200  MD  Maastricht,  The  Netherlands. 
0167-4870/90/$03.50  0  1990  -  Elsevier  Science  Publishers  B.V.  (North-Holland) 184  A.  oan  Wirteloosfut@  /  Learning  VI economic  theory 
changing  economic  circumstances.  As  Maital  (1982)  puts  it: 
‘A  major  feature  of  modem  industrial  economies  is  the  preeminence  of  knowledge.  . Growth 
of  such  knowledge  is  exponential  and  rapid.  To  master  even  a  small  part  of  it  long  years  of 
study  are  needed,  and  a  major  part  of  the  life  cycle  is  now  devoted  to  acquiring  knowledge 
rather  than  applying  it.  The  result  is  a  prolongation  of  childhood.’  (Maital  1982:  46) 
In  the  explanation  of  economic  behavior,  either  performed  by 
children  or  adults,  a  theory  of  learning  constitutes  a  vital  link.  In  this 
respect,  economic  theory  does  not  show  an  impressing  record  of 
achievement. 
Although  the  role  of  learning  in  economic  behavior  is,  at  least  since 
Keynes  (1936),  broadly  recognized  as  being  of  crucial  importance, 
economics  just  includes  a scanty  theory  of  learning.  As  far  as economic 
theory  offers  models  of  learning,  it  focuses,  in  general,  on  the  adjust- 
ment  of  the  value  of  parameters  or  variables  in  reaction  to  disap- 
pointed  expectations.  However,  in  this  way  economists  present  too 
narrow  a view of  learning  behavior. 
In  this  paper  a  taxonomy  of  learning  is  presented  with  a  threefold 
purpose.  First,  the  taxonomy  offers  a  framework  to  evaluate  the 
achievements  of  economic  theory  with  regard  to  modeling  agents’ 
learning  behavior.  Besides,  now  and  then  interesting  notions  of  psycho- 
logical  theory  are  quoted,  which  may  be  fruitfully  introduced  in  eco- 
nomic  models.  Second,  the  comparison  of  the  taxonomy  and  economic 
theory  points  to  possible  future  lines  of  research,  so  that  economic 
models  can  be  enriched  by  accounting  for  a  wider  scope  of  agents’ 
learning  behavior.  Third,  an  initial  impetus  is  given  to  a  worked  out 
economic  theory  of  learning  that  elaborates  on  Fuhrer’s  (1987)  work. 
In  advance,  a  remark  is  in  order.  For  the  sake  of  clarity,  in  what 
follows  the  line  of  reasoning  is  mainly  focused  on  learning  in  the 
context  of  expectations  formation,  although  the  argument  renders  valid 
for  whatever  kind  of  learning  behavior.  Modeling  of  procedures  of 
expectations  formation  enjoys  considerable  popularity  in  the  economic 
literature. 
The  article  is organized  as follows.  In  section  2  a general  framework 
of  expectations  formation  is described.  Section  3 is devoted  to  present- 
ing  a  first  sketch  of  the  current  state  of  the  art  in  ‘mainstream’ 
economics  with  regard  to  the  inclusion  of  a  theory  of  learning  in 
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is  presented.  In  section  5  the  rare  deviating  contributions  to  the 
introduction  of  learning  in  economic  theory  are  briefly  discussed. 
Moreover,  a preliminary  step  into  the  direction  of  an  extended  theory 
of  learning  in economics  is presented.  Section  6 offers  a brief  introduc- 
tion  of  interesting  psychological  notions  of  learning.  In  section  7  an 
elaborated  theory  of  economic  learning  is  illustrated  by  presenting  an 
exemplary  model  in analogy  to  Fuhrer  (1987).  Section  8 concludes  final 
remarks. 
2.  Expectations  formation 
Uncertainty  is  an  indispensable  aspect  of  economic  theory.  Many 
important  economic  phenomena,  such  as  speculation,  money  and  dis- 
equilibrium,  exist  by  the  grace  of  uncertainty.  In  order  to  anticipate 
unknown  future  developments,  economic  agents  deploy  expectations 
formation.  Many  decisions  are  made  on  the  basis  of  conjectures.  With 
the  help  of  past  and/or  current  information  economic  agents  seek  to 
formulate  expectations  of  relevant  future  variables  and  conditions. 
The  procedure  of  expectations  formation  in  economic  theory  is  in 
general  represented  by  a function  which  describes  the  relation  between 
objective  and  subjective  data  on  the  one  hand  and  an  expectation 
variable  (E)  on  the  other.  Hicks  (1939)  distinguishes  three  types  of 
data:  i.e.,  information  regarding  (i)  past  and/or  current  actual  values 
of  the  expectation  variable  (A);  (ii)  other  economic  variables  and 
conditions  (0);  and  (iii)  noneconomic  factors  (N).  The  functional 
relation  describes  a model  of  the  economic  world (M),  which  is part  of 
a  set  of  models  that  reflect  a  particular  view  or  paradigm  (S)  of  the 
economic  world.  Hence, 
E=M(a,,  A,  0,  N),  with  ME  Sh  and  g=  l,...,  m,  (1) 
where  (Y  represents  parameters,  h  is in the  set  { 1,.  . . , n },  and  m  and  n 
denote  the  number  of  parameters  and  paradigms  respectively. 
Expectations  formation  may  be  subject  to  two  extreme  conditions. 
First,  the  expected  and  actual  value  of  the  variable  concerned  may 
coincide.  So, 
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where  t  is a time  index  and  A denotes  the  actual  value  of  the  variable. 
E ,_-l,l  represents  the  expectation  of  the  value  of  the  variable  (E)  at 
time  t  as  made  at  time  t -  1.  This  condition  of  perfect  foresight  is 
rather  popular  in  economic  theory.  For  instance,  many  general  equi- 
librium  models  are  based  on  an  assumption  of  perfect  foresight  (see, 
for  example,  Arrow  and  Debreu  1954;  Debreu  1959;  and  Arrow  and 
Hahn  1971).  Second,  fundamental  uncertainty  may  introduce  the  im- 
possibility  to  formulate  whatever  expectations  model.  Advocates  of  a 
dominant  presence  of  fundamental  uncertainty  are  neo-Austrian  (for 
example,  Lachmann  1943)  and  post-Keynesian  (for  instance,  Shackle 
1972)  economists. 
3.  Expectations  formation  and  learning  in economic  theory 
According  to  Forgeaud  et  al.  (1986)  in  economics  two  categories  of 
learning  procedures  can  be  discerned: 
‘(i)  Some  of  them  assume  that  the  structure  of  the  model  is  known,  and  that  the  value  of  the 
structural  parameters  are  unknown.  _. 
(ii)  In  another  approach  the  endogenous  variable  is  during  the  learning  phase  forecast  using  an 
automatic  statistical  procedure  such  as  exponential  smoothing,  the  Box-Jenkins  method,  or 
regression  on  instrumental  variables.  These  automatic  methods  are  in  general  applied  without 
explicit  reference  to  the  structural  model.’  (Forgeaud  et  al.  1986:  845-846) 
A  well-known  example  of  the  second  type  of  learning  procedure  is 
Cagan’s  (1956)  adaptive  expectations  model.  Adaptive  expectations  are 
based  upon  a  simple  error-learning  hypothesis.  Cagan  illustrates  the 
error-learning  mechanism  with  the  help  of  price  expectations  by  saying 
that 
‘the  expected  rate  of  change  in  prices  is  revised  per  period  of  time  in  proportion  to  the 
difference  between  the  actual  rate  of  change  in  prices  and  the  rate  of  change  that  was 
expected.’  (Cagan  1956:  37) 
Hence, 
E  t-1,r  =  %z,r--l +  (Y. (A,_,  -  E,_,,,_,),  where  (Y  > 0.  (3) 
Adaptive  expectations  are  equivalent  to  autoregressive  and  distrib- 
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value  of  a  variable  as  a  weighted  average  of  its  past  rates  of  change 
(Cagan  1956:  39): 
E  1-1,,=~.(A,_1-A,_2)+A,_2,  where  (YBO.  (4) 
Distributed-lag  expectations  direct  the  revision  of  expectations 
through  extrapolations  of  time-series  of  the  actual  values  of  the  expec- 
tation  variable  in  the  past.  After  a  new  observation  is  noticed,  agents 
revise  their  expectations  by  a  successive  extrapolation.  Hence, 
E  f-1.t  =qa,,  A~)  =(y,_1  -A,_*  +~1,_~.A,-2+  ...  +~I--,-~I-z, 
forg=t-l,...,t-zanda>O,  (5) 
where  z  denotes  the  number  of  observations  employed  and  (Y the 
weight  of  the  observation  concerned.  In  general  (Y,_; < at_i  if  i <j, 
which  points  to  the  premise  that  observations  are  considered  more 
relevant  when  they  date  from  a  more  recent  past.  ’ A  special  case  of 
adaptive  expectations  is  introduced  by  Keynes  (1936).  Keynes  argues 
that  in  circumstances  where  considerable  scarcity  of  information  pre- 
vails,  economic  agents  adopt  the  convention  that  the  existing  state  of 
affairs  is expected  to  re-occur  in  the  future  (Keynes  1936:  152).  So, 
E f-1,f  =  A f-l'  (6) 
In  general,  adaptive  expectations  (except  for  Keynes’  convention)  are 
associated  with a simple  learning  procedure,  because  a new observation 
simply  leads  to  a renewed  extrapolation.  ’ 
However,  adaptive  expectations  reflect  a  procedure  of  expectations 
formation  in  which  a  structural  model  is  conspicuous  by  its  absence. 
Hence,  adaptive  expectations  are  based  upon  ad  hocery.  The  theory  of 
rational  expectations  offers  a  response  to  this  critique.  Ever  since  the 
early  1970s  rational  expectations  replaced  the  adaptive  learning  proce- 
’  In  general,  the parameters  are  assumed  to remain  constant  over  time.  When  variable  parameters 
are  introduced  (see,  for  example,  Tumovsky  1969)  the procedure  is basically  the same. 
r Keynes  (1936:  50-51)  and  Fisher  (1930:  419)  are  predecessors  of  Cagan’s  formalization  of 
adaptive  expectations  (Ruthledge  1977).  In  effect,  even Walras  (1874)  adopted  a  simple adaptive 
expectations  mechanism  which shows close  resemblance  to  Keynes’  convention  (as  argued  in Van 
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dure  at  the  center  of  economic  theorizing  (see,  in  particular,  Lucas 
1972;  and  Sargent  and  Wallace  1975).  Rational  expectations  reflect  the 
dominant  manifestation  of  the  first  type  of  learning  procedure  in  the 
economic  literature.  Muth  (1961)  the  founding  father  of  the  rational 
expectations  theory,  argues  that 
‘expectations,  since  they  are  informed  predictions  of  future  events,  are  essentially  the  same  as 
the  prediction  of  the  relevant  theory.’  (Muth  1961:  316) 
Economic  agents  (behave  ‘as  if’  they)  make  use  of  the  ‘true’  model 
of  the  economy,  because 
‘individuals  should  not  make  systematic  mistakes  in  forecasting  the  future.  It  is  not  appealing 
to  assume  that  individuals  make  predictable  errors  yet  take  no  action  to  revise  their  rule  for 
forming  expectations.’  (Begg  1982:  1) 
In  this  way,  the  rational  expectation  hypothesis  even  postulates  the 
learning  process  concerning  the  structural  model  to  have  ceased  such 
that  agents  or  the  economy  as  a  whole  behave  (‘as  if’  they  are) 
well-informed  about  the  ‘ true’  model  of  the  economy.  3 As  Shaw  (1987) 
puts  it: 
‘In  other  words,  for  Muth  the  essential  assumption  is  that  economic  agents  will  form 
subjective  expectations  concerning  future  economic  variables  which  are  equal  to  the  true 
mathematical  conditional  expectation  to  be  taken  by  those  variables.  .  Assuming  he  knows 
the  correct  model  which  governs  the  economy  -  that  is  assuming  his  learning  process 
generated  by  past  experience  is  complete.’  (Shaw  1987:  189;  italics  added) 
Hence,  agents  base  their  expectations  on  the  ‘true’  model  (M)  and 
paradigm  (S)  of  the  economy,  using  all relevant  and  available  informa- 
tion  (A,  0  and  N).  4 
3 Snippe  (1986)  distinguishes  three  versions  of  the  strong  form  of  expectations:  the  ‘micro  as  if’, 
the  ‘macro  as if’  and  the  descriptive  variant.  Although  in  the  case  of  ‘as  if’  variants  the  knowledge 
of  the  ‘true’  model  is  not  assumed,  agents  (‘micro  as if)  or  the  economy  as a whole  (‘macro  as if’) 
are  postulated  to  behave  ‘as  if’  the  true  model  is  known. 
4 It  should  be  noted  that,  therefore,  rational  expectations  are  not  by  definition  associated  with 
perfect  foresight.  Three  phenomena  may  prevent  the  occurrence  of  perfect  foresight.  First, 
nonsystematic  shocks  may  introduce  white  noise.  Second,  not  all  necessary  information  may  be 
available  at  the  time  expectations  are  formed  (see,  for  example,  Lucas  1975).  Third,  costly 
information  processing  and  gathering  may  cause  economic  agents  to  select  the  information  used 
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The  rational  expectations  hypothesis  has  been  criticized  for  being 
empirically  and  theoretically  implausible.  The  empirical  critique  simply 
follows  from  the  fact  that  economic  agents  do not  and cannot  know  the 
‘true’  model  of  the  economy  (Shaw  1987:  190-191).  Even  economists 
are  far  from  consensus  concerning  the  ‘true’  theory  of  the  economy 
(Shaw  1987:  193).  The  theoretical  objection  points  to  the nonergodicity 
of  (economic)  nature.  Davidson  (1983),  in  line  with  Shackle  (for 
example,  1972  and  1974),  argues  that  each  crucial  individual  decision 
and  act  changes  the  structure  of  the  economy  in an  unpredictable  way. 
However,  the  rational  expectations  hypothesis  is  in  conflict  herewith, 
because  a  ‘true’  model  implies  the  postulate  that  reality  can  be  de- 
scribed  as  a  stochastic  process,  which  remains  unaffected  by  the 
manner  expectations  are  formed,  and  which  represents  an  unchanging 
structure  of  the  economy.  However,  reality  differs  fundamentally  from 
this  ergodic  description,  so that  learning  is inevitable. 
In  order  to  meet  the  critique  of  the  absence  of  adaptive  behavior, 
economists  have  introduced  learning  processes  in  a  rational  expecta- 
tions  framework.  It  is  shown  that  learning  leads  to  convergence  to 
rational  expectations  (see,  for  instance,  Bray  1983;  Strassl  1986;  For- 
geaud  et  al.  1986;  and  Feldman  1987).  However,  these  models  still 
suffer  from  serious  shortcomings.  First,  learning  does  not  occur  with 
regard  to  the  structural  model.  In  fact,  the  correct  structural  model  is 
known  to  the  agents,  who  only  adapt  the  values  of  parameters  during 
the  learning  phase.  Feldman  argues  that 
‘agents  are  Bayesian  decision  makers  whose  prior  beliefs  are  consistent  with  the  underlying 
structure  of  the  world  they  inhabit.  If  in  the  original  model  agents  don’t  “know”  the 
rational  expectations  equilibrium  it  is  because  they  are  uncertain  of  the  parameter  values.’ 
(Feldman  1987:  635) 
Hence,  second,  the  theoretical  critique  of  the  mere  existence  of  a 
‘true’  model  is bypassed. 
Of  course,  economists  often  steer  the  middle  course  by  adopting  an 
expectations  procedure  based  on extrapolating  a structural  model  which 
is not  assumed  to be  the  ‘ true’ reflection  of  the working  of  the economy 
(see,  for  example,  Schiantarelli  1983;  and  Morrison  1986).  However, 
then  learning  behavior  still  occurs  in  the  form  of  simple  renewed 
extrapolations,  so  that  the  validity  of  the  model  specification  and 
paradigm  remains  beyond  doubt.  Friedman  (1979)  introduces  ‘semi-ra- 190  A.  oan  Witteloostuijn  /  Learnrng  in economic  theory 
tional’  expectations.  Agents’  expectations  formation  depends  on  an 
optimal  learning  process.  Expected  values  are  a  weighted  average  of 
adaptive  and  rational  expectations.  As  time  passes,  conjectures  con- 
verge  to  rational  expectations. 
By  way  of  conclusion  it  can  be  said  that  ‘mainstream’  economic 
theory  of  expectations  formation  introduces  too  narrow  a  scope  of 
learning  behavior,  because  only  adjustment  of  the  values  of parameters 
or  variables  is  included.  Hence,  neither  the  validity  of  the  model  (M) 
nor  the  paradigm  (S)  employed  is  brought  up  for  discussion.  As 
Bacharach  (1986)  argues: 
‘What  is missing is a satisfactory  Theory  of  Belief for  individual economic  agents.  By  a Theory 
of  Belief  for  economic  agents,  I  mean  a  theory  that  encompasses  many  disparate  sorts  of 
phenomena.  A Theory  of  Belief deals not just  with the beliefs that an agent  has at a moment  of 
time,  but also  the way he comes  by  them,  and  the way he comes  to  abandom  them;  the weight 
he gives  to  the  testimony  of  authorities,  the strength  of  his beliefs;  the different  categories  of 
his  beliefs  -  his  expectations  about  the  future  values  of  variables,  certainly,  but  also  the 
theories  of  the  economy  and  the  proverbs  about  the  economy  he beliefs.’  (Bacharach  1986:  175; 
italics  added) 
4. A  taxonomy 
Weick  (1979),  Bateson  (1980),  Hoekstra  (1982)  and  Earl  (1983)  offer 
interesting  insights  of  learning  behavior  that  point  to  a classification  of 
learning  procedures.  Weick  and  Hoekstra  offer  a  subjectivist  theory  of 
the  way  organizing  proceeds.  Organizing  is  regarded  as  a  process  of 
which 
‘the  environment  is viewed as  an  output  rather  than  an  input.’  (Weick  1979:  288) 
In  this  respect,  their  theory  shows  close  resemblance  to  those  of 
subjectivist  economists  like  Lachmann  (1943  and  1966),  Shackle  (1972 
and  1974)  and  Earl  (1983). 
The  interaction  between  a decision  maker  and  the  environment  is of 
crucial  importance  in  the  process  of  organizing.  The  environment 
contains  ecological  changes.  Ecological  changes  are 
‘discontinuities  ,  differences  .  ,  or  other  variations  that  engage  attention  __  These 
differences  may  provide  the  occasion  for  attempts  at  equivocality  removal  and  attempts  to 
determine  the significance  or  triviality  of  the differences.’  (Weick  1979:  130) A.  uan  Wilteloosruijn  /  Learnrng  in economic  theory  191 
The  interaction  between  a  decision  maker  and  the  environment  is 
equivocal,  because,  in  the  first  place,  information  -  reflecting  ecologi- 
cal  changes  -  is  multi-interpretable  5  (compare  with,  for  instance, 
Heider  1958;  and  Frick  1959)  and,  in  the  second  place,  a  decision 
maker  and  the  environment  are  mutually  dependent.  In  the  nexus  of 
organizing  cause  maps  play  an  important  role.  Cause  maps  are 
‘labeled  variables  that  are  causally  connected.’  (Weick  1979:  187) 
In  economic  terms  a cause  map  is the  structural  model  of  the  world, 
which  is equivalent  to  Lachmann’s  ‘mental  picture  of  the  world’  (1943: 
72)  and  Bacharach’s  ‘theories  of  the  economy’  (1986:  175).  The  equiv- 
ocality  of  the  environment  introduces  the  need  for  expectations  forma- 
tion. 
Because  the  dependency  between  a decision  maker  and  the  environ- 
ment  is  reciprocal,  four  types  of  learning  must  be  distinguished 
(Hoekstra  1982):  ‘correcting’,  ‘corresponding’,  ‘incorporating’  and  ‘de- 
bating’.  The  first  three  are  based  on  Bateson  (1980:  114)  and  the  last 
one  on  Kuhn’s  (1970)  work  on  scientific  (r)evolution. 
Correcting  is reflected  in attempts  to change  the  environment  so that 
information  corresponds  to  rigid  cause  maps.  Rigid  cause  maps  are 
manifest  in  unshakable  views  and  beliefs  as  firm  as  a  rock.  A  rigid 
cause  map  leads  to  a  search  for  information  that  fits.  Unfitting  infor- 
mation,  although  probably  relevant,  is  ignored.  Rigid  cause  maps  are 
closely  related  to  self-fulfilling  prophecies  (Watzlawick  et  al.  1967)  and 
normative  reference  points.  Ecological  changes  remain  undiscovered, 
and  learning  and  adaptation  are  blocked.  Correcting  implies  that  none 
of  the  elements  of  expectations  formation  are  brougt  up for  discussion. 
The  validity  of the  values of the parameters  ((Y), information  (A,  0  and 
N),  cause  map  or  structural  model  (M)  and  paradigm  (S)  are  taken 
for  granted.  The  value  of  the  expectations  variable  (E)  is unchanging. 
Correcting  shows  resemblance  to,  for  example,  behavior  in  an  en- 
vironment  of perfect  foresight  and  an attitude  similar  to Simon’s  (1945) 
routines,  Keynes’  (1936)  conventions  and  Seligman’s  (1975)  learned 
helplessness  in  the  sense  that  behavioral  adjustments  and  changes  are 
5 Multi-interpretability  of  information  shows  close  resemblance  to  the  notion  of  uncertainty.  In 
Van  Witteloostuijn  (1987)  a  differentiated  approach  to  the  concept  of  uncertainty  is  offered. 192  A.  um  Wifreloostu&~  /  Learning  in economic  theory 
conspicuous  by  their  absence.  Correcting  reflects  a decision  maker  who 
either  perceives  an  unnecessity  or  impossibility  to  learn  or  is  slow  of 
understanding.  The  former  represents  the  adaptive  absence  of  learning, 
because,  for  example,  expectations  are  confirmed  in  a  situation  of 
perfect  foresight  (see  eq.  (2))  or  fundamental  uncertainty  flowers  such 
that  Keynes’  conventional  behavior  shows  up (see  eq.  (6)).  6 Moreover, 
in  particular  circumstances  routinized  behavior  is  the  optimal  strategy 
to  follow,  for  example  because  information  gathering  and  processing  is 
too  costly  (Baumol  and  Quandt  1964).  However,  in  general  the  domi- 
nance  of  routines  blocks  appropriate  adaptivity.  In  this  context,  two 
examples  are  worthy  of  mention. 
First,  routinized  behavior  as  described  by  the  behavioral  theory  of 
organizations  (see,  for  instance,  Simon  1945;  March  and  Simon  1958; 
and  Cyert  and  March  1963)  may  be  a  manifestation  of  crisis  manage- 
ment  (Weick  1979:  246-247;  Koutsoyiannis  1979:  401;  and  Van  Wit- 
teloostuijn  1988).  Second,  Seligman’s  (for  instance,  1975  and,  in  coop- 
eration  with  Garber,  1980)  learned  helplessness  theory  describes  behav- 
ior  that  is  dominated  by  correcting,  because  an  individual  has  fallen 
into  the  trap  of  depression  in  combination  with  negative  self-fulfilling 
prophecies.  In  general,  persistent  correcting  is  an  unhealthy  strategy, 
because 
‘flexibility  is  required  so  that  current  practices  can  be  modified  in  the  environment.  The 
[individual] must  detect  changes  ___ and  it  must  retain  a  sufficient  pool  of  novel  actions  that 
these  ecological  changes  can  be accommodated  to  and  recognized.’  (Weick  1979:  215) 
A  way  of  increasing  flexibility  is  the  adoption  of  a  corresponding 
strategy.  When  corresponding  occurs,  a  decision  maker  reacts  to  eco- 
logical  changes  by  deploying  learning  behavior.  In  the  first  instance, 
however,  not  the  environment  but  rather  the  decision  maker  adapts 
with  the  help  of  employing  frexible  cause  maps.  New  information  is 
now  introduced  into  the  cause  map  in  a  flexible  way.  In  effect, 
corresponding  reflects  the  traditional  learning  procedure  in  economic 
theory.  A  fixed  and  constant  cause  map  is  modified  in  order  to  fit 
more  closely  to  the  information  received  by  means  of  adjusting  expec- 
tations  of  parameters  (a)  and  variables  (A,  0,  N).  Neither  the  cause 
6 The  link between fundamental  uncertainty  and conventional  expectations  formation  is nowadays 
stressed  by post-Keynesian  authors  (for  instance,  Davidson  1972;  Minsky  1975;  and  Kregel  1976 
and  1982).  See also  Hoogduin  (1987)  and  Hoogduin  and  Van  Witteloostuijn  (1987). A.  oan  Witteloostuijn  /  Learning  in economic  theory  193 
map  or  structural  model  (M)  nor  the  paradigm  (S)  are  called  into 
question.  Corresponding  is reflected  in  the  adaptive  learning  procedure 
(eqs.  (3)  to  (6))  and  learning  in  a  rational  expectation  framework 
(section  3). 
Incorporating  brings  learning  a  step  further  in  the  form  of  adapta- 
tion  of  the  cause  map  or  structural  model.  The  decision  maker  moves 
beyond  the  prevailing  cause  map.  Weick  (1979)  includes  the  choice  of 
the  interpretation  of  the  world  in  the  process  of  decision  making,  as 
reflected  in  ‘selection’,  which 
‘is  the  .  . process  that  generates  the  answers  to  the  question  “What’s  going  on  here?’  The 
selection  process  selects  meanings  and  interpretations  directly  .__  The  selection  process 
houses  decision-making,  but  it  is  crucial  to  remember  that  decision-making  in  the  model 
means  selecting  some  interpretation  of  the  world  and  some  set  of  extrapolations  from  that 
interpretation  and  then  using  these  summaries  as  constraints  on  subsequent  acting.’  (Weick 
1979:  175;  italics  added) 
According  to Bateson  (1980)  and  Hoekstra  (1982)  this drastic  type  of 
learning  mainly  occurs  in  times  of  crisis.  Only  if  correcting  and 
corresponding  strategies  have  failed,  a decision  maker  deploys  incorpo- 
rating.  As  Bateson  (1980)  argues,  a  decision  maker  is  forced  to  adopt 
an  incorporating  strategy  when  persistent  ecological  changes  emerge. 
Incorporating  may  take  the  form  of  adjusting  the  prevailing  cause  map 
(‘reframing’)  or developing  new ones (‘neo-framing’).  Reframing  means 
that  the  prevailing  structural  model  (M)  is  elaborated  by  introducing 
alternative  specifications  or  new  variables  (A,  0,  N).  Neo-framing 
implies  that  the  prevailing  model  is  replaced  by  an  alternative  one 
within  the  same  paradigm.  Hence,  although  the  validity  of  the  struct- 
ural  model  is  called  into  question,  the  economic  agents  adhere  to  the 
prevailing  paradigm  (S).  Incorporating  shows  close  resemblance  to 
Bacharach’s  (1986)  call  for  a  ‘theory  of  belief.  The  rare  examples  of 
notions  of  incorporating  in  economic  theory  are  discussed  in  the  next 
section. 
A  last,  ultimate  type  of  learning  corresponds  to  Kuhn’s  (1970) 
paradigm  switch  (compare  with  Lakatos  (1970)  as  referred  to  by  Earl 
1983:  132).  Debuting  calls  into  question  the prevailing  paradigm  and  is, 
therefore,  rarely  adopted.  A  paradigm  reflects  the  total  set  of  cause 
maps  which  an  economic  agent  regards  as  plausible  and  acceptable. 
Hence,  when  debating  occurs,  the  economic  agent  invalidates  the 
advocated  paradigm  (S).  For  example,  an  economist  who  drops  a 194  A.  uan  Witteloostutjn  /  Learning  in  economic  themy 
neo-Austrian  belief  in  the  market  mechanism  in  favor  of  a  Keynesian 
view  of  economy-wide  persistent  disequilibrium  deploys  a  debating 
strategy.  ’ 
5.  The  incorporating  strategy  in  economic  theory 
Lachmann  (1943)  is  an  early  example  of  an  economist  who  has  an 
open  eye  for  a broader  scope  of  learning  behavior  in  economic  theory. 
Lachmann  argues  that  as  a result  of  the  predominance  of  the  influence 
of  fundamental  uncertainty  mental  pictures  of  the  world  play  a crucial 
role  in  decision  making  and  expectations  formation: 
‘Economic  action  .._  is  often  decided  upon  in  a  penumbra  of  doubt  and  uncertainty,  vague 
hopes  and  inarticulate  fears,  in  which  the  ultimate  decisions  may  well  depend  on  mental 
alertness,  ability  to  face  the  unknown.  Expectations,  it  is  true,  have,  so  to  speak,  to  pass 
through  a  “filter”  in  the  human  mind,  and  the  undefinable  character  of  this  process  makes  the 
outcome  unpredictable.  _.  What,  then,  are  expectations?  _.  We  now  have  to  realise  that,  as  a 
prerequisite  to  making  a  plan,  we  have  to  draw  a  mental  picture  of  the  situation  in  which  we 
are  going  to  act,  and  that  the  formation  of  expectations  is  incidental  to  the  drawing  of  this 
picture.’  (La&man”  1943.  reprinted  in  1977:  65,  67  and  72) 
The  extreme  subjectivist  stance  Lachmann  is  taking,  is  also  a  recur- 
rent  theme  in  the  work  of  Shackle  (see,  for  instance,  1972:  156).  Both 
authors  stipulate  the  indeterminate  nature  of expectations  formation,  so 
it  is not  surprising  that  neither  offers  an  elaborated  theory  of  incorpo- 
rating  behavior. 
Two  rare  examples  of  contributions  to  economic  theory  in  which 
notions  of  learning  behavior  are  introduced  which  move  beyond  simple 
corresponding  strategies,  are  Earl  (1983)  and  Fuhrer  (1987).  Earl  is 
inspired  by  Kelly’s  (1955  and  1963)  theory  of  personality.  The  central 
notion  of  Kelly’s  theory  is  the  inquiring  person: 
‘Kelly  suggests  that  it  may  be  fruitful  to  view  people  as  if  they  are  scientists  in  a  very  general 
sense  _,  who  [are]  attempting  to  come  to  grips  with  the  world  by  an  empirical  process.  The 
inquiring  person  seeks  to  discern  patterns  in,  or  impose  order  upon,  the  complex  world  in 
which  she  finds  herself.’  (Earl  1983:  119;  Earl’s  italics) 
’ Of  course,  the  above  obscures  the  fact  that  some  models  of  learning  are  valuable  for  some  types 
of  economic  agents  or  some  type  of  situations  only.  Space  limitations  obstruct  a  detailed  comment 
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An  interesting  attempt  to  model  formally  an  incorporating  strategy 
is Fuhrer  (1987). 
Fuhrer  exploits  a  statistical  technique  which  may  be  used  to  guide 
economic  agents’  decision  making  concerning  the  structural  model  they 
employ  whilst  forming  expectations: 
‘The  tack  of  this paper  is to  assume  that  the agent  considers  the  true  process  to  be  among  a 
finite set of processes,  each of which he initially assigns a probability  of being true. This  allows 
him to statistically  evaluate what benefit additional  information  might yield:  more  information 
resolves  some  of  the  model  uncertainty  and  thus  makes  the probability  of  choosing  a  wrong 
model  lower.’  (Fuhrer  1987:  686) 
Hence,  on  the  basis  of  a cost-benefit  analysis  agents  choose  one  out 
of  a  given  set  of  competing  structural  models.  As  time  passes  the 
additional  information  gathered  permits  learning  behavior  concerning 
the  expectations  models.  However,  starting  point  of  Fuhrer’s  analysis  is 
a  given  set  of  competing  models.  Search  behavior  may  offer  a  key  to 
introduce  a  variable  set of  competing  models.  Of  course,  the  search  for 
competing  interpretations  of  the  world  -  which  determines  the  choice 
set  of  possible  interpretations  of  the  world  -  has  to  move  beyond  ad 
hocery.  In  this  respect,  two remarks  are in  order. 
First,  the  trial  and  error  search  process  may  (partly)  be  guided  by 
situation  indicators  (compare  with  Fuhrer  1987).  If  an  agent’s  prevail- 
ing  cause  map  is  not  (or  no  longer)  able  to  produce  satisfactory 
predictions,  then  the  agent  may  turn  to  an  alternative  structural  model 
that  is supported  by  situation  indicators  (compare  with  Hill  1986).  For 
instance,  a  persistently  high  level  of  unemployment  associated  with 
historically  low wages may point  to a Keynesian  model  of the  economy, 
whereas  accelerating  inflation  in combination  with little  unemployment 
and  a fastly  growing  amount  of  money  may  increase  the  plausibility  of 
a monetarist  interpretation.  Second,  search  behavior  may  be  guided  by 
a cost-benefit  analysis.  In  this  respect,  Stigler’s  (1961)  search  theory  is 
worthy  of  mention  (for  an  extensive  survey  of  labor  search  models  see 
Lippman  and  McCall  (1976)). 
Search  behavior  for  alternative  interpretations  of  the  world  on  the 
basis  of  situation  indicators  shows  resemblance  to  a  ‘contingency’ 
approach.  The  contingency  approach  enjoys  (increasing)  popularity  in 
many  areas  of  social  research,  for  instance,  Janis  and  Mann’s  (1977) 
conflict  model  of  decision  making  and  the  contingency  approach  to  the 
study  of  organizations  (for  example,  Lawrence  and  Lorsch  1967;  and 196  A.  uan  Witteloostmjn  /  Learning  in  economic  theory 
Mintzberg  1979).  Particular  decision-making  rules  or  organization 
structures  respectively  are  assumed  to  be  a  sequel  to  particular  antece- 
dental  conditions  or  contingencies. 
6.  Simple  learning  principles 
In  the  foregoing  it  is  suggested  that  the  four  types  of  learning 
strategies  follow  in  a particular  order.  In  general,  only  when  an  agent  is 
continually  confronted  with  failing  anticipations,  the  validity  of  the 
prevailing  structural  model  is  questioned.  The  learning  process  concern- 
ing  the  structural  models  in  use  may  be  based  upon  traditional  learning 
principles  implying  the  stiffening  of  succe.s.sful  cause  maps.  This  princi- 
ple  is  at  least  as  old  as  psychology  and  economics  themselves.  In  this 
section  only  a brief  glance  at  some  simple  learning  principles  is  offered, 
because  an  extensive  survey  of  learning  theories  lies,  of  course,  beyond 
the  scope  of  this  paper. 
Behaviorism  in  psychology  reflects  a  well-known  and  firmly  em- 
bedded  tradition  of  the  study  of  learning  behavior  *  (see,  in  particular, 
Skinner  1938  and  1953).  The  behaviorist  learning  theory  is  influenced 
by  Thorndike’s  (1913  and  1932)  psychological  laws  of  learning,  the 
most  important  one  being  the  ‘law  of  effect  ‘, 
‘which  deals  with  the  strengthening  or  weakening  of  connections  as  a result  of  experience  and 
reinforcement.’  (Murphy  and  Kovach  1972:  315) 
Reinforcement  -  reflected  in  the  consequences  of  a  particular  type 
of  behavior  -  is  manifest  in  punishments  and  rewards.  Reinforcement 
or  extinction  of  behavioral  patterns  is  determined  by  rewards  and 
punishments  of  responses,  as  is  shown  in  many  laboratory  experiments 
(see,  for  example,  Skinner  1938  and  1953;  and  Bandura  1969).  This 
result  is  explained  by  arguing  that  individuals  strive  for  a  positive 
balance  between  rewards  and  punishments.  The  hedonistic  tradition  is 
also  predominant  in  economics,  as  is,  in  particular,  manifest  in  utility 
theory  (see,  for  instance,  Boland  1981;  Hirshleifer  1985;  Yunker  1986; 
and  Van  Witteloostuijn  1988). 
s Psychological  behaviorism  is  to  be  clearly  distinguished  from  economic  behaviorist  theory.  The 
former  is  based  upon  the  stimulus-response  notion  of  Pavlov  (1906  and  1927),  whereas  the  latter 
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The  behavioral  learning  theory  in  the  Skinnerian  tradition  is  often 
accused  of  representing  a  ‘black  box’  notion  of  the  human  mind. 
However,  in  fact  many  behaviorist  psychologists  have  introduced  inter- 
nal  mind  processes.  As  Hall  and  Lindzey  (1978)  describe,  for  example, 
Dollard  and  Miller’s  (for  instance,  1941  (with  the  authors  in  reversed 
order)  and  1950)  incorporation  of  reasoning  and planning: 
‘Reasoning  is  essentially  a  process  of  substituting  internal  cue-producing  responses  for  overt 
acts.  As  such,  it  is  farly  more  efficient  than  overt  trial  and  error.  Not  only  does  it  serve  the 
function  of  testing  symbolically  the  various  alternatives,  it  also  makes  possible  the  substitution 
of  the  overt  response  alternatives  originally  available.  It  is  possible  through  the  use  of 
cue-producing  responses  (thoughts)  to  begin  at  goal  situation  and  work  backward  until  the 
correct  instrumental  response  has  been  identified,  a  feat  that  would  not  ordinarily  be  possible 
in  motor  learning.  Planning  is a special  variety  of  reasoning,  where  the emphasis  is upon  future 
action.’  (Hall  and  Lindzey  1978:  585)  9 
The  learning  principles  of an ‘internal  mind’  behaviorist  theory  show 
close  resemblance  to  Kelly’s  inquiring  person  and  Fuhrer’s  process  of 
model  selection.  First,  economic  agents  select  one  or  more  of  the 
alternative  interpretations  of the world on the basis  of covert  reasoning. 
Second,  they  test  the  chosen  models  empirically  with  the  help  of  overt 
trial  and  error.  In  this  way,  the  law of  effect  also  guides  incorporating 
learning  behavior. 
At  this  point  an  interesting  parallel  can  be  drawn  with  a  debate  in 
econometrics.  Hill  (1986),  backed  by  Freedman  (1986),  Lane  (1986), 
Learner  (1986)  and  Sims  (1986),  argues  that  econometricians  do,  in 
general,  insufficiently  question  the  validity  of  the  models  they  use,  but 
rather  behave  as  if  the  models  are  true.  According  to  Hill  a  better 
practice  is  to  reconsider  time  and  again  the  models  employed.  Then, 
‘basically  the  situation  with  regard  to  a  model  that  you  tentatively  entertain  is  that  you 
continue  to  use  it  until  either  there  is  evidence  that  it  no  longer  works  well  enough  for  the 
purposes  you  have  in mind,  or  until  you  know  of  some  other  model  or  ways  to do  the  forecasts 
that  works  better.  Empirically  bad  performance  of  a  forecasting  technique  might  be  the  basis 
for  both  abandoning  the  use  of  a  particular  model,  and  for  searching  harder  to  find  a  model 
(and  its  implementation)  that  works  better.’  (Hill  1986:  198) 
However,  an  important  question  is  still  unanswered:  where  do  eco- 
nomic  agents’  new  or  modified  alternative  models  come  from;  or, 
9 Except  from  reasoning  and  planning  social  behaviorist  theorists  introduce  the  role  of  expectan- 
cies  as  well  (see,  for  instance,  social  learning  theory  of  Rotter  and  Hochreich  (1975:  96)). 198  A.  uan  Witteloosturjn  /  Learning  in  economic theory 
equivalently,  in  which  way  do  reframing  and  neo-framing  proceed?  In 
this  respect,  two  possibilities  show  up:  socialization  or  imitation,  and 
creativity  or  imagination.  Socialization  and  imitation  point  to  the 
opportunities  the  economic  agent’s  environment  reaches.  Agents  are 
able  to  learn  from  the  behavior  by  others  by  adopting  alternative 
models  of  the  world  that  other  people  use.  Socialization  and  imitation 
theories  are  well-known  in  social  psychology.  These  social  learning 
theories  seek,  in  particular,  to  explain  the  development  of  children’s 
behavior  (see,  for  instance,  Piaget  1970;  Bandura  1977;  and  Jahoda 
1979).  However,  adults  also  profit  time  and  again  from  the  learning 
opportunities  offered  in  their  environment.  Moreover,  in modern  times 
the  influence  of  experts  and  the  media  is increasing  (Katona  1975). 
An  interesting  example  in  economics  can  be  found  in  the  theory  of 
technological  progress.  Firms  are  permanently  striving  to  introduce 
profitable  technological  improvements.  The  introduction  of  improved 
processes  or  products  can  be  reached  through  two  strategies:  imitation 
or  innovation  (see,  for  instance,  Kamien  and  Schwartz  1982;  and 
Nelson  and  Winter  1982).  However,  economic  theories  only  partly 
succeed  in  endogenizing  technological  progress,  because  the  innovative 
technological  opportunities  emerge  like  pennies  from  heaven  (Van 
Witteloostuijn  and  Maks  1988).  Hence,  although  economics  and  psy- 
chology  successfully  incorporate  socialization  and  imitation  in  learning 
theories,  the  treatment  of  innovation,  creativity  or  imagination  still  is 
unsatisfactory.  Probably,  a learning  theory  of  incorporating  in  the  form 
of  neo-framing  is difficult  to  offer. 
7.  An  illustrative  model  of  incorporating 
To  clarify  matters,  this  section  offers  an  illustration  of  a model  that 
captures  incorporating  learning  behavior.  The  model  (partly)  draws  on 
Fuhrer  (1987).  Since  the  model  only  seeks  to  clarify  a  procedure  of 
model  learning,  technical  details  are  missing.  lo The  fact  of  the  matter 
is  that  the  structural  expectations  model  employed  by  an  agent  (M)  is 
endogenous  rather  than  given.  This  requires  the  specification  of  a model 
learning  principle.  Below  one  decision  round  is described.  Of  course,  at 
”  For  example,  factors  of  influence  like  cost  of  information  gathering  (Fuhrer  1987)  and 
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each  point  in  time  (i.e.,  if new and  relevant  information  is acquired)  an 
agent  may  decide  to  repeat  the  learning  procedure.  l1 
Suppose  that  there  is  an  economic  agent  who  is  searching  for  an 
appropriate  expectations  model  of  a variable  E.  The  agent  requires  an 
estimation  of  E,,  ,  in  order  to  decide  on  what  action  to  undertake  at 
time  t.  (One  may  think  of,  for  example,  an  investor  who  has  to  decide 
on  whether  to  buy  guilders  or  dollars.  This  decision  requires  a conjec- 
ture of  the  future  exchange  rate  r,,,.  ) The  agent  considers  a finite  set  F 
of  f  possible  models  of  E.  Provided  that  the  model  set  is  time 
invariant.  i*  that  is 
F=  {‘M,...,‘M}.  (7) 
(It  should  be  noted  that  the  ‘true’  structural  model  is  not  necessarily 
part  of  F.) 
The  agent  attributes  a  belief  k  (i  = 1,.  . . , f)  to  the  proposition  that 
model  iM  is  true  on  the  basis  of  currently  available  information  (1,). 
That  is  to  say,  g  describes  the  (agent’s  subjective)  probability  that 
model  ‘A4 represents  the  process  which  generates  variable 
tional  upon  I,.  The  set  G  is composed  of  all beliefs.  Hence, 
G,=  {lg,..->fg/l,}~ 
where  Cf= i’g =  1. 
The  next  step  is  to  determine  a  potential  loss  matrix  L 1+1-  An 
E,  condi- 
element  L’j  (i,  j  = 1,.  . . , f  and  i #j;  time  index  is  suppressed)  of  this 
matrix  refers  to  the  loss  the  agent  would  incur  if  (s)he  decides  on  the 
basis,of  the  wrong  model  ‘M,  while  model  ‘it4  is  true.  So,  if,  assuming 
that  ‘A4 is  true,  the  decision  which  follows  from  ‘E  (representing  the 
value  of the expectations  variable  according  to model  iM)  yields  benefit 
iB,  then  Lii = ‘B -jB  (where  ‘B  is,  in  inevitable  analogy,  the  benefit 
which  follows  from  deciding  on  the  basis  of ‘E).  In  deciding  on  which 
expectations  model  to  adopt  the  agent,  of  course,  takes  into  account 
”  Here  no  attention  is paid  to  the empirical  validity of  the  learning mechanism  presented  below. 
It  is  simply  an  example  of  how  incorporating  might  be  adapted  to  concrete  behavior  by  Some 
category  of  agents  in making  some  type of  decisions. 
I2 This  assumption  is not  critical.  In  the preceding  section  some  further  remarks  have been  made 
on  endogenizing  the  model  set  F.  Here  one  may  think of  the  role  of  socialization,  imitation  and 
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her  or  his  beliefs.  For  example,  in  accordance  with  expected  utility 
theory  the  agent  decides  by  choosing  the  structural  expectations  model 
‘M  which  minimizes  the  product  of  G,  and  L,,,.  That  is, 
MinD,  ,+1  =  G;L,+,, 
‘M  ’ 
where  D  represents  the  expected  potential  loss  uector.  Decision  rule  (9) 
implies  that  the  agent  will  not  necessarily  decide  to  employ  the  ‘best’ 
model  (that  is,  the  model  associated  with  the  highest  prior  belief).  I3 
Suppose  that  the  agent  collects  new information  at  time  t +  1 (I,,,). 
On  the  basis  of  I,,  1 the  agent  adapts  the  beliefs  that  were  operational 
at  time  t.  So, 
The  final  step  boils  down  to  specifying  a learning  rule.  For  illustrative 
purposes,  two  examples  are  briefly  discussed:  ordinary  least  squares 
(OLS)  and  Bayes’  revision  statistics  (BRS).  l4 
After  a  (series  of)  new  observation(s)  is  obtained,  an  agent  who 
employs  an  OLS  procedure  seeks  to  carry  out  a  regression  on  the 
structural  models  under  consideration.  This  gives a set  C of  correlation 
coefficients  ( R2)  conditional  upon  the  new  information  I,,,:  C,,,  = 
{ ‘R2,.  . . , fR2/11+1}.  The  li  k  e  lihood  that  a  model  is  true,  follows  from 
normalizing  the  set  of  correlation  coefficients.  That  is, 
k(I,+,> =~R2(I,+1),[~~2(Sl)]  for  i=l,...,f. 
The  BRS  technique  (Fuhrer  1987)  implies  that  prior  beliefs  are 
adapted  to posterior  ones  after  new data  are obtained.  Let  ‘g( I,)  denote 
I3 Here  one  may  introduce  all other  kinds of  decision  rules and  considerations.  For  example,  the 
minimizing rule (9)  can  be replaced  by a satisficing  principle.  That  is to  say,  an agent  sticks to  the 
model  currently  employed  if  the  expected  loss  remains  below  some  critical  (aspiration)  level. 
Moreover,  considerations  of,  for  instance,  risk attitude  or  regret  avoidance  can  be included. 
t4Additional  examples  can  be  derived  from  other  econometric  techniques.  Econometric  tech- 
niques  (like  OLS)  cannot  be  used  as  a  matter  of  course,  since  they  are  associated  with  many 
conditions  (see,  for  instance,  Kennedy  1985).  Moreover,  simpler  learning  mechanisms  can  be 
adopted  (for  instance,  ‘eye judgement’  by  drawing  a  graph  or  using  only  a  restricted  amount  of 
information).  The  key  point  is,  however,  that  the  learning  procedures  in  the  text  illustrate  that 
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the  prior  belief  (on  the  basis  of  time  t’s  information)  that  model  ‘44  is 
true.  The  rule  of  BRS  describes  a weighted  average  of  the  agent’s  prior 
belief  [‘g( I,)]  and  the  likelihood  that  ‘M  is  true  conditional  upon  the 
new  data  [‘h( 1,+i)].  ls  In  effect, 
‘d4+1)  = [idww,+l)]/ iid4Ywt+1)  i  j=l 
for  i=  l,...  f. 
8. Debating,  creativity  and  imagination 
(12) 
In  the  foregoing  it  is  suggested  that  a  theory  of  learning  in  eco- 
nomics  should  move  beyond  correcting  and  corresponding  by introduc- 
ing  incorporating  and,  probably,  debating  learning  strategies.  In  this 
way,  economic  theory  would  also  include  learning  with  regard  to  the 
structural  models  and  paradigms  of  the  world.  As  the  investigation  of 
economic  theories  of  expectations  formation  shows,  ‘mainstream’  eco- 
nomic  modeling  is,  at  most,  restricted  to  learning  behavior  concerning 
the  values  of  parameters  and  variables.  The  validity  of  the  structural 
models  and  paradigm  in use is not  brought  up for  discussion. 
Moreover,  an  argument  is  put  forward  that  the  traditional  law  of 
effect,  as  is  predominantly  manifest  in  economic  utility  theory  and 
psychological  learning  frameworks,  can  also  be  applied  to  incorporat- 
ing  behavior.  An  economic  agent  who  is  continually  confronted  with 
failing  anticipations  may  start  to  call  into  question  the  plausibility  of 
the  theory  of  the  economy  in use. Therefore,  an agent  may  try, perhaps 
for  once,  an  alternative  model,  in  this  way  deploying  an  incorporating 
strategy.  If,  after  some  time,  the  new  model  proves  to  predict  superior 
relative  to  the  old model,  then  the  new model  may  be  adopted  as guide 
for  future  behavior.  Successful  predictors  stiffen  and  unsuccessful 
models  stimulate  search  for  new  ones.  New  or  modified  structural 
models  are  reached  through  socialization  or imitation,  and  creativity  or 
imagination. 
I5 The  conditional  likelihood  that  a  model  ‘M  is  true  follows  from,  for  example,  an  OLS 
procedure:  ‘h( I,+,)  =‘g(I,+,),  where  ‘g(I,+,)  follows from  eq. (11). 202  A.  uan  Witieloostuip  /  Learning  in  economic  theory 
Socialization  and  imitation  point  to  the  crucial  importance  of  cult- 
ural  and  social  factors.  The  latter  are  also  manifest  in  debating.  A 
paradigm  determines  the  likelihood  that  an  agent  will  adopt  particular 
models  of  the  world.  It  is at  least  highly  unlikely,  not  to  say  impossible, 
that  an  agent  living  in  the  middle  ages  decided  to  drive  a  car,  rather 
than  riding  a  horse.  Before  the  publication  of  The  General  Theory 
(Keynes  1936)  the  Keynesian  interpretation  of  the  working  of  the 
economy  did  not,  as  nowadays,  belong  to  the  plausible  and  settled 
cause  maps.  Therefore,  economic  agents  did  not  easily  (or  rarely)  adopt 
a  Keynesian  structural  model  to  interpret  the  world  and  guide  expecta- 
tions  formation  and  behavior. 
A  last  remark  is  in  order  with  regard  to  creativity  or  imagination  in 
the  context  of  an  incorporating  learning  strategy  in  the  form  of 
developing  new  models  of  the  world  (neo-framing).  Neo-framing  refers 
to  finding  new  interpretations  of  the  world  that  are  not  yet  existing.  To 
endogenize  creativity  in  economic  models  is  a  difficult  task  to  accom- 
plish.  Although  authors  like  Kirzner  (for  instance,  1979  and  1985)  and 
Shackle  (for  example,  1972  and  1974)  stipulate  the  role  of  the  creative 
moment  and  imagination  in  decision  making,  they  fail  to  explain  its 
source  and  way  of  working.  Only  trial  and  error  and  stochastic  processes 
may  cover  part  of  creativity  without,  however,  explaining  it.  The  same 
reservation  holds  in  psychology.  As  Murphy  and  Kovach  (1972)  state: 
‘Perhaps  because  of  the  same  problem  of  complexity,  professional  psychology  also  neglected 
the  question  of  creative  thinking  Psychology  was  challenged  by  the  problem  of  creativity 
and  its  relation  to  thinking,  as,  for  example,  in  Guilford’s  work  (1964)  on  creativity  and  in  his 
distinction  between  “convergent”  and  “divergent”  thinking  (1959),  but  it  had  not  as  yet 
produced  a  massive  response.  Creativity  is  often  a  process  of  “rearrangement”  and  there 
are  many  remaining  questions  as  to  how,  when,  why,  and  by  whom  the  new  and  the  old  raw 
materials  .  and  under  what  conditions  the  origina,  the  unpredictable,  the  psychologically 
new,  and  socially  important  appear.’  (Murphy  and  Kovach  1972:  435) 
However,  notwithstanding  the  difficulties  one  encounters  while 
studying  creativity,  the  development  and  incorporation  of  enriched 
theories  of  learning  in  economics  offers  clear  opportunities  to  economic 
psychology.  In  particular,  economics  is in  need  for  a  theory  of  learning 
with  regard  to  the  structural  models  of  the  world  that  agents  employ  in 
order  to  guide  expectations  formation  and  behavior.  Except  from 
theoretical  work,  empirical  investigations  are  needed.  In  this  respect,  an 
interesting  point  of  departure  is reflected  in  the  measurement  of  agents’ A.  uan  Witteloostuijn  /  Learning  in  economic  theory  203 
perceptions  of  the  world.  In  this  context,  three  examples  are  worth 
mentioning.  First,  Katona’s  (1975  and  1977)  contribution  to  economic 
psychology  in  the  form  of  his  work  on  consumers’  sentiments  shows 
that  agents’  perceptions  of  the  economic  world  are  liable  to  measure- 
ment.  Second,  in  the  marketing  literature  a  long  tradition  exists  to 
measure  consumers’  attitude  to  products  (see,  for  example,  Howard 
and  Sheth  1969;  and  Engel  and  Blackwell  1982).  Third,  economic 
psychologists  investigate  people’s  lay  theories  of  public  tax  and  ex- 
penditure  (see,  for  instance,  Aitken  and  Bonneville  1980;  Lewis  1980 
and  1983).  The  techniques  employed  to  measure  agents’  perceptions 
and  attitudes  are,  probably,  also  suitable  to investigate  the  determinants 
of  and  changes  in  perceptions,  so  that  insights  result  that  offer  ele- 
ments  of  agents’  learning  behavior  with regard  to  the  structural  models 
of  the  world  they  use. 
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